Since about 2005, the border has been considered invisible, with little or no physical infrastructure, with security barriers and checkpoints being eliminated as a result of processes introduced by the Good Friday Agreement (or « Belfast Agreement » signed in 1998).    This agreement has the status of both an international treaty between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland (the Anglo-Irish Agreement) and an agreement between the parties in Northern Ireland (multi-party agreement). Former British Prime Minister John Major has argued that Brexit could lead to a hard border, with the European Union and the UK having to control their borders for customs purposes.  The Conservative Party research group believes that the UK may have the choice of not controlling its border if VAT is not imposed or controlling the border to apply possible VAT on goods imported after Brexit.  2 There is a general consensus that the UK`s exit from the European Union will have a negative impact on the Irish and Northern Irish economies, as well as on cross-border trade and relations between Ireland and Northern Ireland, particularly in some sectors heavily dependent on trade, such as agriculture and food. However, if a general agreement has still not been reached between the political parties London, Brussels, Dublin and Northern Ireland on the status of the Irish border after Brexit, it is not only because of these potentially negative socio-economic effects. This is mainly due to the fact that the current soft border system is an integral part of a very complex constitutional and institutional order, created by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) and ratified by two simultaneous referendums in Ireland and Northern Ireland. Therefore, it can rightly be argued that the reason the Irish border is so controversial today is because the GFA has not provided a real and consensual solution to the unwelcome question of the very status of the Irish border. Despite 20 years of peace and a 56% majority in Northern Ireland in favour of remaining in the EU, northern Ireland`s Unionist and Nationalist nationals still do not agree on what will happen to this border. In other words, if Brexit raises several problems and debates on the Irish border issue, it is not so much the consequence of Brexit itself as a symptom of the initial weaknesses of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). By opening a new chapter in Britain-EU relations, abandoning the terms of a treaty negotiated with these institutions, Mr Johnson is opening a new chapter in Britain-EU relations. It dissolves the pragmatic tradition of foreign policy in an acid bath of Europhobic paranoia.
The Prime Minister justifies the rejection clauses of the law by the fact that Brussels threatens the « territorial integrity » of the United Kingdom. It raises the prospect of a « blockade » – the vengeful obstruction of agricultural goods flowing from the rest of Britain to Northern Ireland. It is too twisted by the unit to work even as a caricature of the facts. 14 Therefore, the GFA, as a common and reciprocal redefinition of British and Irish public sovereignty over Northern Ireland, was a remarkably incomplete and unfinished constitutional process. The withdrawal of the United Kingdom and its border problem in Ireland show that the 1998 agreement did not go far enough to provide for an explicit, indisputable and constitutional (new) definition of the Dublin and London obligations as the sovereign guarantee of the agreement. The proposed withdrawal agreement would end the special regime for Northern Ireland if a solution could be found that would provide a border as pictured as the one that became the Good Friday agreement until Brexit.